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1. IYTRODL’CTION 
Personal social support networks (thereafter PSSN) are a key to understanding 
the worki,ng of Soviet Georgian society and its notorious informal (alternative) 
economy. The phenomenon however is not limited to Georgia but it 
reverberates throughout the USSR in a process which Shliapentokh labelled 
‘the Georgianisation of the Soviet Union’ (1985:29), which is essentially the 
spread of the Georgian type network. 
An examination of the structure, dynamics and operation of PSSN in Soviet 
Georgia, where they are highly developed, should allow us to understand the 
role of PSSN in centralised command economies. Since it is the PSSN - the 
informal network of friends - which subvert the system, making the PSSN a 
principal instigator of the present up eaval in the economies and societies of 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. hz 
1 Soviet Georgia is considered to have the most developed informal (alternative) 
economy of all Soviet republics : Altman, 1983; Grossman, 1977; Wiles, 1980. 
Other common synonyms of the informal (alternative) economy are: second; 
black; hidden; underground; illegal; parallel; shadow; illicit. 
2 Altman. 1989. 
2 
I) m. THE STRUCTURE OF PERSONAL SOCIAL SUPPORT NETWORKS 
Frame 
Ego is the focal point of his network.3 Ego’s network is kinship- based: 
Georgian families trace decent on both sides but stress the male line and 
within it an emphasis on agnates - on the solidarity and mutual obligations of 
brothers. The network extends beyond one’s core family to include intimate 
friends: since in Georgia’s structure the peer group is second only to the 
family in importance as a source of social ranking and support. The core 
personal socia 
d 
support network therefore consists of a personal cell and an 
intimate zone. That is a minimal, not a maximal definition. And it assumes 
a stable network, since kin are ascribed and close friends have to endure tests 
over time. 
Extent 
Even by its minimal definition the scope of a network is considerable. Let us 
examine the following examples (figure I). Ego has a father, a brother and 
two uncles - father’s brother and mother’s brother and a wife (who has a 
father and a brother). He has also two close friends5 and so does each of the 
other males in the network. This again is a conservative estimate since quite 
often one will have more than two Megobarebi and some people even have 
Dzmobilebi (meaning “like brothers”). 
However, even this conservative estimate suggests that Ego has eight 
at the heart of this network and 26 more as close ‘friends of friends’ 61 
embers 
, that is, 
people who are as committed to Ego’s core of eight as the latter are 
committed to him. This means that Ego has a 34-man strong legion at his 
disposal, which is his Core PSSN. 
But, in essence, networks will have an ever expanding tendency as each 
member of the network, serves as a ‘link-pin’ in a Likert type organisation 
where society is conceived of a matrix of interlocking groups (Likert, 196 1). 
The difference between the Core PSSN and the much expanded network 
depends on the services the network is called upon to perform (see following). 
3 Although PSSN are applicable to women as well as men and women will have 
their own PSSN, women’s networks however will be heavily influenced by the 
networks and opportunities created by the male PSSN. While analysis is 
generalised to the Soviet Georgian society as a whole, its focus is on men’s 
PSSN. 
4 Terms taken from Boissevain, 1978. 
5 Close friend is known as Megobari (Megobarebi - pl) literally, one who eats 
from the same plate. 
6 Boissevain. 1978 
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3. INTERACTIONS IN NETWORKS 
Social,‘Economic’ Transactions 
<Any transaction will normally be initiated by Ego to a member of his network 
and if necessary through him to another member - and so on - until the 
required service is obtained. To illustrate rhis?oint, let us consider a simple 
interaction involving a trio: myself, a colleague and a friend who was one of 
my key informants. 
When my colleague (B) came to visit me in the field he was the honorary 
guest at a feast organised by my friend (C). As is the normal practice with 
Georgians, the feast involved masses of food and drink, and (B) for who it 
was a first experience - was most impressed. In case he was fooled into 
thinking that the honour was purely his, (C) enlightened him “it’s not really 
you we are honouring, but Yochanan”. In other words, he emphasized the 
fact that by honouring my guest (B), he (C) was really paying his respects to 
me (A). 
The movement of this interaction is graphically presented in Figure 2. It 
shows the transaction going from (C) to (8) via (A). That is, (A) was both 
the direct object of this interaction and the axis that deflected it further. 
The figure also indicates that by honouring my guest (B), I (A) owe (C) a 
favour, and that by the same token my colleague (B) owes me (A) a favour, 
since it was through me (A) that he obtained a service. 
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Figure 2 - A simple transaction of ‘give and take’. 
This pattern of movements does not rule out the establishment of a direct 
bond between (B) and (C), but at this stage this is only a potential bond. (8) 
presented (C) with a present (an expected courtesy), but it was ascribed to 
(A) as well and m of us ((A) and (B)) were thanked for it by (C). 
When after a time my friend (C) went abroad and paid me (A) a visit, my 
colleague (B) reciprocated by inviting the two of us out. The movement 
reversed in the same pattern. By Georgian standards (B) repaid (A) the 
favour he owed him by honouring his guest (C). This time (C) presented a 
gift to (B) and was rather anxious to know whether (A) considered it 
appropriate: after all the gift was addressed on (A’s) behalf. 
7 Gerald Mars with whom I collaborated in several studies on the Soviet 
informal, alternative economy, and who was at that time my doctoral 
supervisor. 
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Figure 3 - A further transaction of ‘give and take’, 
The above are examples of nerfectlv matchinq ‘give and take’ relationships, in 
the direction of movements, the subjects involved and the objects of 
transaction. They need not be so, indeed in reality they rarely are. It is in 
the nature of ‘give and take’ relationship that they’d do better not form a 
close and finite pattern of interactions, as Mauss (1970) noted long ago. It is 
the open ended quality of ‘give and take’ relationships which allow the 
mutual obligations to role on and which sets the whole network into motion. 
Thus, at the end of the transaction depicted in Figure 1, the ‘give and take’ 
relationship between protagonists is that (A) owes a favour to (C) and (B) 
owes a favour to (A). (C) is in credit to (A) and (A) is in credit to (B). But, 
as stated earlier there are two separate accounts here, one is between (A) and 
(B), the other is between (A) and (C). 
A common way to further develop these accounts (in way of a settlement) is 
to reciprocate by doing services to other ‘friends of friends’. That is, (A) will 
do a service to (D) on behalf of (C) and (B) will do a service to (E) on behalf 
of (A). 
Thus, for example, (A) helped (C’s) sister-in-law to find a place in the local 
College of Further Education. This meant that (A) repaid him with a favour 
of a different kind and possibly of a greater value. This suggests that the 
transaction between the two has stayed open-ended and a new member is now 
involved. What’s more, it calls for the relative advantage of specialisation. If 
someone has a specialist niche would it not be wise to take advantage of it? 
In a centralised command economy, where goods and services are in short 
supply and in high demand, such as is the case in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, expert niches become a natural power base for transactions. 
The Functions of Networks 
The Georgian type personal social support networks have two distinct 
functions. These can be distinguished by the object of their utilisation and 
by the frequency of their use. For one-off, trivial transactions, the networks 
are ever expansive. There is a saying in the provincial villages of Western 
Georgia, from where many of my informants hail, that “one can obtain there 
even the milk of birds“, in other words: practically anything one wishes. 
The other case, where the network will tend to be ever expansive is saved for 
emergencies. 
On the other hand, for day-to-day use, the network is finite, as for instance 
for supporting a particular job. 
Let us examine these different functions one by one. 
a) The hlovement of Goods and Services 
Figuratively, relations between people encompass a range of goods and 
services exchanged amongst them, in barter transactions. If we were 
to replace the social interactions with goods and services exchanged, 
the network in action will look like in Figure 4. 
One surprising outcome of this movement of scarce goods and 
services, is that it creates a more egalitarian society, After all, even a 
high ranking official requires a pair of shoes from time to time, spare 
parts for his child’s bicycle and seats on the train for the 
1 
olidays. 
Where shortage prevails, belonging to the Nomenklatura, is no 
guarantee to acquiring the necessary life essential 
b 
except for a thin 
layer of the very top officials of the ruling elite for whom special 
shops and pass cards have made living comfortable. 
Money loses its grip in these circumstances. As a result of the strong 
parallel economy and the lack of attractive spending routes or 
;uyc;gYb 
venues, money is abundant. It alone cannot guarantee 
: the PSSN, acting as a selective consumers club and buyers 
and sellers market all-in-one, is the effective answer. 
This is an essential difference between the Georgian type network and 
other similar informal networks in centralised bureaucracies. Latin 
America, as Lomnitz has shown in her studies, is dominated by circles 
of friends where social distance is of prime importance in determining 
the nature of services available and the normative conventions for 
acquiring them (Lomnitz, 1988, 1977, 1971). Where friendship circles 
become inappropriate, because of incompatibility of rank, patron- 
client relations will develop (Lomnitz, 1988, 1971). This is by no 
means limited to the new world, nor to the new African democracies, 
where this pattern of informal networks prevails (Szeftel, 1983; Riley, 
1983). The crime networks of Southern Italy have long been operating 
in similar fashion. 
8 The elite administration. 
9 The top Party and state apparat members, army and security forces generals, 
academicians and the cultural elite. 
10 “It is no longer a currency, it is a lottery ticket” - the Rouble has been 
branded in muscovite circles (A Nove : Against All Odds New Statesman and 
Society 19th Jan 1990, p.19) 
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Figure 4 - PSSN in Action : The Movement of Goods and Services. 
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While Georgian type networks do incorporate aspects of patron-client 
relations and of a closed social club {‘;I am not drinking with anybody” 
would be a common expression), their emphasis is on mutual 
reciprocity, based on an honourable association of equals. Where a 
provision is unobtainable, within the core PSSN, there will always be 
found the individual ‘link-pin’ who has a foot in the appropr:nte 
network for getting “even the milk of birds”. Recall that the Georglsn 
type network has an ever expanding tendency, operating in a Likert- 
type matrix of interlocking groups. 
b) Emergencies 
The same goes for emergencies. When a member of a Core PSSN is in 
danger, whether it involves the obtainment of rare antibiotics for a 
sick child or the sorting out of someone caught operating in the 
informal economy, the network will expand to its fullest capacity to 
perform the miracle. 
The following is an account of such a case.12 It is told by an 
informant who was seventeen at the time it happened. The main 
protagonist is his father who was running a small shop in a typical 
Georgian small market town. The events took place at the beginning 
of the seventies. 
“On Monday the traders got warning of a possible raid sometime 
during the coming week. The warning arrived from a person who was 
not a trader but had much invested interest in the market. He was ‘a 
silent partner’ to some of the shops there. This person had a link to 
somebody in Tbilisi who would be expected to know of such things. 
A check with the local officials failed to verify the warning. They 
did not know anything, but people in the market nonetheless took the 
warning seriously. After all it came from a highly regarded person. 
Some of them closed their shops for the whole week - most of these 
were the more established shopkeepers. Some said they were sick, 
others had family obligations. You don’t need too much of an excuse. 
The rest, including my father, could not afford to close entirely. So 
they tried their luck.’ 
11 On the significance of drinking and networking see Mars and Altman, 1988 
12 First published in Mars and Altman, 1983. Other case studies are reported in 
a forthcoming book, co-authored with Mars on the Georgian-type second 
economy. 
A few stayed open all the week - others closed only on certain days. 
My dad. closed on Tuesday and Wednesday and opened on the 
Thursday. Thursday, being market day, involved obviously a higher 
risk - but also a higher chance for earning, especially as some shops 
did not operate because of the scare. The special control committee 
ar;ar;“,“,~~ Thursday. It was a central committee on an irregular check 
- and that is why the local officials were not told. 
A local boy of fourteen was given some money to buy 
my dad’s shop. The boy was probably a Komsomalnik. 
r4few things at 
Three men. 
disguised as customers, watched him. He purchased a pair of trousers 
and was charged 4.40R instead of 3.60R; a pair of socks for 3.20R 
instead of 1.2OR and an elastic band for underwear of which he got 
7m instead of 9m as change. The control men identified themselves, 
charged my dad with speculation (which is a criminal offence) and 
ordered him to close his shop, which was thereafter sealed until a 
formal enquiry was set up. He was taken immediately to the town’s 
police station. 
The rumour spread immediately at the market place and details 
quickly reached our home - though we lived some two hours away by 
train. At once all our relations and neighbours came in to share the 
tragedy with us. My father’s brothers and my mother’s cousin - who 
happened to visit the town at that time - started to plan how to get 
him out of the mess. First of all, all the goods we had at home were 
dispersed quickly to face a possible police raid on our home. They 
were put, for the time being, at my father’s brother’s place. 
He asked this person to come urgently from Tbilisi and both went to 
see a senior policeman. Of course they took a lot of risk, since they 
demanded the release of my father as well as the dropping of charges 
against him. The charges however could not be dropped though they 
were much reduce 
ds handed in, in cash.’ 
This was arranged for 5,000 roubles to be 
My uncles and my mother’s cousin made a contact with the head of 
the police station where my father was arrested. It seemed possible to 
release him for a considerable amount of money. My mother’s cousin 
proved to be of crucial importance. He was much richer than our 
family - he ran a factory in Tbilisi and had many contacts with 
officials there and knew in person the man who had issued the 
warning to the market traders. 
13 This is a rather common method of by-passing the local authorities. This was 
an ad-hoc committee, comprised of persons from the commerce departments 
in some local governments and representatives from the central office of the 
OBKhSS (the economic police). 
14 A member of the communist youth, who help - among other civilian duties - 
in controlling consumer prices. 
1.5 Comparing this account with other information and discussing this case with 
other informants revealed that this was not an excessive demand in the given 
circumstances. 
13 
How was sum raised in a short time? 2,OOOR were given by ml 
family. Part of it we held at home as a matter of regularity for 
emergencies. The rest was given as a 1 n by my relatives. 3,OOOR 
were raised by the traders in the market. PI 
On his release father went, together with a few other? (including me), 
to empty his shops of the illegal goods he held there. 
Luckily, dad was clever enough to have left a window unlocked - 
through which we managed to get in with the help of the gatekeeper 
who w’as given IOOR. We dispersed the goods among the other shops 
in the market - the traders had authorised the gatekeeper to open 
their shops to do so. But a considerable amount was loaded on a van 
we bought with us. On leaving, we phoned our house from the 
gatekeeper’s home, saying ‘the birds are on their way’ which was an 
agreed code meaning: ‘the goods are on the way - be ready to disperse 
them’. 
My mother’s cousin was driving. He was a man in his thirties and 
very tough. Since it was early morniflg, we were easily detected by 
the police patrols and ordered to stop. 
Of course we could not stop and a chase developed. But we knew the 
roads very well and managed to get away. On arrival we unloaded at 
my mother’s cousin’s place, since our home could already have been 
under surveillance. Small tra 
% 
rs were waiting with cash to buy the 
goods off us at purchase price. 
As emernencv ~001s in times of trouble, Georgian type networks can 
mobilise vast resources as a member’s career, future and even life may 
be at stake. It is then that a network will spread to its maximum 
capacity often involving dozens of people most of whom will never 
meet the protagonist for whose sake they have been mobilised. 
16 The loans were given under no guarantee, without any condition or specified 
time for their return. It was all done on the understanding that a person’s 
honour commits him and his family to see to it that the loans are returned as 
soon as possible, In this particular case it took 18 months to return the lot. 
17 Instead of the 34 items he was licensed to deal with, he stocked 240. 
18 Police patrols are a constant factor to consider when distributing goods. 
There should be a bill of lading (factura) specifying the source and target of 
all goods in transit, as well as exact composition of these goods. This is why 
most illegal deliveries are carried out during day-time when their likelihood 
of raising suspicion is much lower, 
19 That is - not to take advantage of the person’s difficulty. 
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C) Occupations and Networks 
The day-to-day working of the Georgian type network is essentially 
limited to its Core PSSN. 
This is manifested most clearly in the occupational choice 
(recruitment, promotion) of network members (Mars and Altman. 
1983). There is a direct relation between the extent of one’s Core 
PSSN, the mix of occupations presented in the Core PSSN and one’s 
likelihood to chose a particular profession or to stick to it. 
Table 1 outlines the Core PSSN strengths of individuals in some 
common occupations. There is an almost direct relationship between a 
job holder’s PSSN strength, the remunerations that a job can attract 
and the risks associated with it. 
Just to clarify, in Soviet type command economies, almost nQ position 
can be held without some risks, since it is almost axiomatic that in 
order to do a proper job (as well as to gain some extra money on top 
of the official meagre income) one needs to circumvent the system, 
thereby opening oneself to potential charges of misconduct and/or 
criminal offence (Altman, 1989). 
The following are some ordinary occurrences evidenced by ordinary 
peopl who lived all their lives in Georgia, prior to immigrating to the 
West. 40 
A store keeper: “Even a shop-floor worker, if he has some brains and 
some guts, will take a few items from his workplace so he can enter a 
shop and exchange them for other goods”. 
A village general store manager: “One day my old school headmaster 
entered my office. He took me aside and handed me over a handful 
of notes. ‘These are my savings for the last three years. 
whatever is required but get me a decent suit of import quality”‘.2 T ake 
A taxi driver: “You always get more than the traffic meter shows, 
Instead of one rouble, you will expect to be given 1.20R or 1.30R. 
Instead of two roubles - 2.50R perhaps 3R. Even a government 
official who calls me on official travel will give me extra”. 
A young GP: “After you complete a persons check-up and before 
she/he leaves, she/he will slide 5 roubles into your pocket - sometimes 
less. sometimes more”. 
20 Quotes taken from Mars G and Altman Y - How a Soviet Economy Really 
Works in M Clarke (ed) Corruption Francis Pinter, Oxford, 1983. 
21 The headmaster might not be making illicit profits in his job, but he has to 
use the illicit economy to provide him with clothes expected of this position 
(or else his standing in his own Core PSN may be affected). 
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Weight 
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Score 
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- 
- 
i 
d b ;I ,d 
ii8 
Barber 1+l 2 
Shoemaker/Repairer 1+1+1+2 5 
Hatter l+l+l+l 4 
Small Snackbar Operator 2+1+1+1+1+1+1 8 
Blue-collar Worker 1+2+1+1+1+1+1+2+1 II 
400-600R 
400-600K 
300- 500R 
300-400R 
250K 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
--- 
J 
/ 
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1+2+2+1+1+2+1 IO 
2+1+1+1+2+1+1+2+1 12 
3+1+1+3+2+3+1+1 15 
2+I+I+l+l+I+l 8 
-__- 
J 
$ 
Shop Assistant 
Shoemaker: Foreman 
and Middleman 
Taxi Driver 
Small Shopkeeper 
300- 500K 
600-900K 
800- I ,000K 
500-800K 
Average I .25 
Supermarket Manager 3+3+3+3+3+3+1+1 20 
Small Factory Executive 3+1+3+3+3+3 I6 
Medium Factory Executive 2+2+3 7 
Big Factory Executive 3+3+1+3+3+3+3 I9 
Import Warehouse Executive 3+2+l+l+l+l 9 
Physician 1+3+3+3+3+3 I6 
A VL’lKlgu 4.50 
2,000-2,500R 
I ,OOO-2,OOOR 
I ,OOO- I ,500K 
2,000- IO,OOOK 
3,000-5,OOOK 
Starter I ,000K 
Specialist up to 
15,000K 
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The dav-to-dav function of the Core PSSN is to suDDort its members, 
bv reducing these occuDational risk%. This can be done by members 
of the network becoming involved themselves (as active or silent 
partners), by providing crucial (inside) information and know-how or 
by supplying links with agencies (like the local police) which are 
Tecessary to allow the smooth execution of a job. This is an ongoing 
Jperation and therefore has to be supported by an ongoing 
commitment, which can only be provided by persons in close relation 
- the Core PSSN. 
4. YIAINTAINING THE NETWORK 
Honour and Trust 
Honour and trust, the universal pillars of informal networks (Lomnitz, 1988) 
are the foundations of the Georgian-type PSSN as well. Honour and trust are 
mutually interchangeable. A person who is not trusted has no honour - 
without honour one cannot be trusted. Naturally, trust is a fundamental 
requirement in a social/economic milieu where informal economic activity is 
a matter of routine. Whether a buyer or a seller, the ‘give and take’ 
transaction is likely to be illegal, or at the minimum, in contravention of 
communist ethics (Altman, 1989). In such circumstances it is futile to sign 
contracts or seek law enforcement,. Necessarily, a man’s work has to be his 
bond. The sanction of breaking a bond is social discredit - which extends 
beyond the individual concerned, to include one’s core PSSN. Indeed the 
Core PSSN members will be expected to honour the commitments of their 
defaulting member. The Core PSSN acts therefore as guarantor to its 
constituent members. This explains why being accepted into a Core PSSN is 
rather difficult: you are either born into it, or have to be a close associate of 
an existing member, positively vetoed by all the others in the group. 
Feasts 
The building of Georgian type networks is done through the institution of the 
feast (Mars and Altman, 1988) where members of the Core PSSN gather 
together with their peers, friends and guests, spending their time socialising 
and interacting. In Soviet Georgia, the feasts are the most favourable and 
most frequented social engagement. It would not be out of the ordinary for 
the average Georgian to spend 2-3 evenings a week feasting. 
The wider social implications of feasts are manifested through the elaborate 
formalised rituals (Mars a,nd Altman, 1988) which are designed to link 
participants - and through them their respective PSSN - in ,bonds of 
friendship and exchanges of honours and goodwill. 
5. PERSONAL SOCIAL SUPPORT NETWORKS AND PERESTROIKA 
The dramatic changes in the USSR initiated by Gorbachev, under the banners 
of Perestroika and Glasnost, were directly instigated by the challenge of the 
informal, alternative economy to the formal system. Gorbachev himself said 
so on many occasions (eg Gorbachev, 1988). At the core of the informal, 
alternative economy are the PSSN, which have been growing in direct relation 
to the worsening economic situation (while the rapid demographic changes, in 
particular increased urbanisation and the expansion in education (Lewin, 
1989) probably served as major facilitators). 
14 
In Brezhnev times, the PSSN came under attack, as a circumvention of 
Communist ideology and 
feast.2 2 
oviet mores, sometimes by attacking its ritual 
manifestation : the For the authorities, the problem is that with 
G!as~~ost it becomes even more difficult to shun away anti-social behaviour, 
while Perestroika brings the Core PSSN to the forefront of the economy by 
encouraging officially sanctioned individual enterprise and private co- 
operatives. 
The Georgian-type PSSN, grown and ripened in the ideal hotbed of the 
Soviet Centralised Command Economy23, has now matured and looks set to 
take over the Weberian type communist bureaucracy. 
22 ‘In Georgia hospitality is under attack’. Muariv (Israel evening daily), 6th 
Sept, 1982. 
23 “An international committee of experts charged with compiling a list of 
conditions that maximise the potential for a large underground economy, 
would invent the Soviet Union” (Grossman and Tremal, 1987:285). 
15 
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